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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court held in 1985 that agency refusals to 
enforce are presumptively unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. In doing so, the Court created an exception for when an agency has 
“consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to 
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Courts and scholars 
have mostly interpreted this abdication exception as capturing only total 
nonenforcement, which is when an agency completely stops enforcing its 
statutory responsibilities. On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit allows review 
of all general enforcement policies, regardless of whether they implicate 
abdication—but rarely do agencies create such official policies. Both these 
approaches, however, fail to allow review when the agency is underenforcing 
its responsibilities so severely that it achieves substantially the same effect 
as total nonenforcement. 
This type of “severe underenforcement” poses concerning problems. It 
can potentially undermine complex statutory schemes and implicates 
constitutional separation of powers concerns. This Note argues that courts 
and scholars have misread the abdication exception to include only total 
nonenforcement. Because severe underenforcement poses the same types of 
concerns that compelled the Court to establish the abdication exception, 
courts should also allow review under the Administrative Procedure Act 
when there is severe underenforcement. Adopting a severe 
underenforcement approach to the abdication exception would help alleviate 
the concerns it poses and check agency overreach via underenforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sixty-seven: the number of endangered Mexican wolves that had been 
killed illegally from their reintroduction into the American Southwest in 
1998 through 2015.1 Fourteen: the number of Mexican wolves that were 
killed in 2016 alone—the highest number in a single year.2 Two: the total 
number of killings that have been prosecuted.3 This high number of killings, 
many of which are classified as potentially illegal,4 presents an opportunity 
for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate and prosecute suspected 
individuals under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). But the DOJ has 
underenforced the ESA by requiring prosecutors to request jury instructions 
that set the mens rea as specific intent; to satisfy that, prosecutors must show 
 
 1 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MEXICAN WOLF RECOVERY PROGRAM: PROGRESS REPORT #18, at 
33 (2015). There were fourteen new deaths in 2016, all of which were still under investigation, but some 
were believed to be illegal killings. Susan Montoya Bryan, Feds: 14 Endangered Mexican Wolves Found 
Dead in 2016, AZCENTRAL (published Jan. 4, 2017, 12:16 PM, updated Jan. 4, 2017, 2:42 PM), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-science/2017/01/04/feds-14-endangered-mexican-
wolves-found-dead-2016/96161412 [https://perma.cc/2MLF-3UK2]. This is out of a current population 
of around 113. See News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2016 Mexican Wolf Population Survey 
Reveals Gains for Experimental Population 1 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/
mexicanwolf/pdf/NR_2016_Mexican_Wolf_Annual_Count.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW8R-5HQW]. Over 
half of Mexican wolf killings are thus estimated to have been illegal mortalities. Larisa E. Harding et al., 
Genetic Management and Setting Recovery Goals for Mexican Wolves (Canis Lupus Baileyi) in the Wild, 
203 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 151, 157 (2016). 
 2 Bryan, supra note 1. 
 3 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 67, WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 181 F. Supp. 3d 651 (D. Ariz. 2015) (No. 4:13-cv-00392). 
 4 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 1. 
112:1171 (2018) Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication 
1173 
that the defendant knew he was shooting an endangered animal.5 Because the 
eventual mens rea prosecutors must prove at trial impacts which cases to 
investigate and prosecute, the difficulty of proving this mens rea beyond a 
reasonable doubt at trial has resulted in fewer prosecutions.6 As the policy 
only rarely results in enforcement, it undermines the deterrent effect of the 
ESA’s criminal prohibition on the killing of endangered species.7 Yet this 
prohibition is one of the statute’s main ways of protecting endangered 
species, and the DOJ’s adoption of this policy cannot easily be squared with 
Congress’s intent in enacting the ESA.8 
Beyond this policy, executive underenforcement has proliferated in the 
last few decades, including under Presidents Ronald Reagan,9 George H.W. 
Bush,10 and George W. Bush.11 More recently, President Barack Obama used 
underenforcement as a tool to achieve policy directives when faced with a 
recalcitrant Congress. For instance, the DOJ deprioritized prosecution of 
certain federal marijuana offenses,12 the Department of Health and Human 
 
 5 See Ed Newcomer et al., The Endangered Species Act v. the United States Department of Justice: 
How the Department of Justice Derailed Criminal Prosecutions Under the Endangered Species Act, 
17 ANIMAL L. 251, 266–67 (2011). 
 6 See id. at 270 (describing DOJ prosecutors as “hobbled” by the higher mens rea requirement). 
 7 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012) (prohibition on taking); see also Newcomer et al., supra note 
5, at 269–70 (arguing that charges under the ESA were “appropriate” for a hunter accused of killing an 
endangered bird, but noting that the hunter escaped penalties due to the mens rea requirement). 
 8 Cf. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978) (“[E]xamination of the language, history, 
and structure of the [ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be 
afforded the highest of priorities.”). 
 9 See Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1125–30 (2015) 
[hereinafter Price, Politics]. For example, from 1980 to 1982, penalties assessed by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration fell 27%, while prosecutions under a key environmental statute fell 
from forty-three to three prosecutions. BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE REAGAN–BUSH ERA 
84 (1995). 
 10 See Price, Politics, supra note 9, at 1130; Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to 
be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce 
the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2003). 
 11 See Price, supra note 9 at 1130–33. 
 12 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. 
Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes 2–3 (Feb. 14, 2014), 
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/banks/dept-of-justice-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7Y7-VJP8]; 
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,  to All U.S. Attorneys, 
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 2–3 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VKB-8QQG]; Memorandum from James 
M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,  to U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden 
Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use 1–2 (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-
marijuana-use.pdf [https://perma.cc/26FK-WN9X]; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,  to Selected U.S. Attorneys, Investigations and Prosecutions in 
States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana 1–2 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2ZY-7ELL]. 
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Services postponed deadlines for key provisions of the Affordable Care 
Act,13 and the Department of Homeland Security implemented deferred 
action programs that relied upon underenforcement of existing immigration 
laws.14 
Legal challenges to agency initiatives have had mixed success.15 This is 
partially due to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal courts’ 
power to review certain aspects of agency decisionmaking. The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),16 which establishes the general scope 
of judicial review for administrative agency action, allows for review of final 
agency action or inaction.17 In Heckler v. Chaney, however, the Court 
interpreted the APA to give an agency’s decision not to enforce a potential 
civil or criminal violation a presumption of unreviewability.18 The Court also 
provided ways to rebut that presumption of unreviewability, one of which 
requires showing that the agency has “‘consciously and expressly adopted a 
general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its 
statutory responsibilities.”19 
 
 13 See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8569–
76 (Feb. 12, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116; Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for 
Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to State Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/
Resources/Letters/Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKQ3-9WJN]; 
Bulletin from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Extension of Transitional 
Policy Through October 1, 2016 (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-
and-Guidance/Downloads/transition-to-compliant-policies-03-06-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ94-
8K78].  
 14 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., for David Aguilar, 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect 
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KYJ-J485] (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)); see also Memorandum 
from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., for León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals 
Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents 
of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JPZ-JJLN] (extending this policy 
to undocumented immigrants who are legal residents or parents of U.S. citizens). 
 15 Compare Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134, 
146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 
285 (2016) (reviewing and enjoining deferred action immigration programs), with West v. Holder, 60 F. 
Supp. 3d 197, 203–04 (D.D.C. 2015) (refusing to review and enjoin marijuana deprioritization policy 
because it fell under the President’s enforcement discretion). 
 16 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012). 
 17 Id. §§ 702, 706. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision narrowly. See Norton v. S. Utah 
Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (“Thus, a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff 
asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”). 
 18 470 U.S. 821, 827–35 (1985). 
 19 Id. at 833 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
112:1171 (2018) Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication 
1175 
This Note explores both how courts and scholars have interpreted and 
should interpret this exception for agency abdication. There are two main 
ways of construing the Chaney abdication exception’s scope: (1) the 
abdication exception applies only when there is complete or total 
nonenforcement or (2) the abdication exception applies if there is either 
complete nonenforcement or severe underenforcement. This Note defines 
severe underenforcement as underenforcement so severe that it reaches the 
same practical result as total nonenforcement, such as when a provision is 
enforced only twice per year when many more opportunities to enforce it 
existed.20 There is also a third approach to all agency enforcement taken by 
the D.C. Circuit, which, instead of focusing on the abdication language, 
allows review when an agency has adopted a general enforcement policy. 
To understand these three approaches, consider three examples. First, 
suppose that the Department of Homeland Security did not investigate or 
deport any illegal aliens for a year. The total nonenforcement and severe 
underenforcement approaches would likely allow judicial review in this 
situation. But under the general policy approach, the agency’s choice not to 
enforce would likely not be reviewable unless the agency adopted a general 
enforcement policy. 
Second, suppose that the Department of Homeland Security went from 
deporting tens of thousands of illegal aliens in one year to deporting fifty the 
next year without any change in the substantive law. Under the total 
nonenforcement approach, a court would likely refuse to review the agency’s 
choice not to enforce because the agency is still minimally enforcing the 
statute. Under the severe underenforcement approach, challengers could 
probably rebut Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability. A court using the 
general policy approach would find the presumption intact unless the agency 
adopted a general policy. 
Third, suppose that the Department of Homeland Security adopted a 
policy that it was categorically not going to deport illegal aliens who fit 
certain criteria. If the agency consequently did not deport those illegal aliens 
but deported others, a court following the total nonenforcement approach 
still might not review the policy. But if the deportation numbers were 
sufficiently low, the severe underenforcement approach may allow review 
of the agency’s decisions not to enforce. In either case, a court could review 
the policy under the general policy approach. 
Ultimately, the best interpretation of abdication for the purposes of 
rebutting the presumption of unreviewability is the severe underenforcement 
 
 20 This definition introduces some discretion, which poses the question of whether courts can—or 
should—easily make this threshold determination of whether there is severe underenforcement. But see 
infra Section IV.C (addressing this concern). 
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approach, which allows review of both total nonenforcement and severe 
underenforcement. The Court established the abdication exception to ensure 
that agencies could not refuse to enforce statutory prohibitions. Because 
severe underenforcement can achieve substantially the same effect, courts 
should interpret abdication to include severe underenforcement and thus 
allow judicial review under those circumstances. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes Heckler v. Chaney and 
the establishment of the abdication exception. Then Part II outlines the total 
nonenforcement approach that most courts and scholars have taken. It also 
explains how they have misinterpreted Chaney to dictate that abdication only 
includes nonenforcement. Next, Part III explains and analyzes the general 
policy approach that some courts, primarily the D.C. Circuit, have adopted. 
Lastly, Part IV discusses how a few courts have used the severe 
underenforcement approach to find Chaney’s presumption rebutted. It then 
delineates how the phenomenon of severe underenforcement poses pressing 
problems in two different contexts. First, it examines environmental law as 
an example of how severe underenforcement harms complex statutory 
schemes in which civil and criminal penalties are overlapping and in which 
there is heavy dependence on federal enforcement. Second, it describes the 
constitutional concerns that severe underenforcement introduces, including 
potential violations of the Presentment Clause and the Take Care Clause. 
Part IV concludes by arguing that courts should interpret abdication more 
broadly to encompass severe underenforcement and explores how to do so 
in a principled way. 
I. HECKLER V. CHANEY AND REVIEWABLE ABDICATION 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the APA to establish a presumption 
of unreviewability for agency decisions not to enforce. The APA allows a 
person who suffered from an agency’s legal wrong or who is aggrieved by 
agency action to judicially challenge that agency’s final action or inaction.21 
The language of § 706 suggests that the reviewing court has broad authority 
to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”22 or 
to set aside agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of 
discretion.”23 This originally led to a general presumption of reviewability 
 
 21 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012) (action); id. § 551(13) (inaction); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 160–61 (1996) (explaining judicial review under the 
APA before and after Chaney). 
 22 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
 23 Id. § 706(1)(A). 
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under the APA.24 Section 701(a)(2), however, creates an exception to this 
presumption to the extent that the “agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law.”25 
The Court’s most recent interpretation of § 701(a)(2) came in the 1985 
case of Heckler v. Chaney.26 In Chaney, death row inmates petitioned the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement action under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, alleging that states’ use of lethal 
injection violated that statute.27 The FDA denied the petition and the inmates 
challenged that denial.28 On appeal, the Court held that agency decisions to 
refuse enforcement were presumptively unreviewable based on three 
rationales.29 First, agency decisions not to enforce involve balancing 
numerous factors within the agency’s expertise, and the agency—rather than 
courts—should decide how to best allocate resources.30 Second, “when an 
agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over 
an individual’s liberty or property rights.”31 Lastly, the Court noted the 
similarities between prosecutorial discretion and agency discretion, stating 
that agencies, like prosecutors, should be free to decide when not to pursue 
enforcement actions.32 
 
 24 See, e.g., Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015) (“[T]his Court applies a 
strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 25 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). The Supreme Court’s first full discussion of § 701(a)(2) came in 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Court found that § 701(a)(2) 
presented a narrow exception to the general presumption of unreviewability when there was “no law to 
apply,” meaning when a reviewing court had no meaningful standards against which to measure agency 
action. See id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26). This decision only muddied the waters: how to 
determine when there was “no law to apply” was unclear. See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding 
Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 707–10 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 659 (1985). Courts 
consequently split over how to determine whether there was law to apply. See Levin, supra, at 710–11. 
For instance, some courts applied the Overton Park test to foreclose judicial review when the statute gave 
no substantive guidance, even if it may have been an abuse of discretion under the APA, while other 
courts reverted to pre-Overton Park tests. See id. at 710. 
 26 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 27 Id. at 823. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 831–32. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 832. 
 32 Id. (noting that both are left to the discretion of the President via his power under the Take Care 
Clause); see also Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 
748 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Enforcement Discretion] (discussing the connections between 
administrative discretion and prosecutorial discretion). As hinted at by the Court, prosecutors have 
extensive prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o 
long as the prosecutor has probable cause . . . , the decision whether or not to prosecute . . . generally rests 
entirely in his discretion.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1178 
According to the Chaney Court, challengers can potentially rebut this 
presumption of unreviewability by showing that “the agency has 
‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to 
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities,”33 which this Note 
refers to as the “abdication exception.” Chaney was not one of those 
situations,34 but the Court cited favorably to a D.C. Circuit case, Adams v. 
Richardson.35 In Adams, the challengers alleged that the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) failed to enforce Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act by continuing to fund segregated institutions rather than 
following the relevant enforcement methods laid out in the statute.36 HEW 
argued that nonenforcement decisions were committed to agency discretion 
and therefore were not judicially reviewable.37 The D.C. Circuit, however, 
refused to apply § 701(a)(2)’s narrow exception to the APA’s presumption 
of reviewability.38 Instead, the court distinguished the case on the basis that 
HEW had “consciously and expressly adopted a general policy which [wa]s 
in effect an abdication of its statutory duty”39—language later quoted in 
Chaney.40 
Other than this footnote reference to Adams, the Chaney Court offered 
no guidance on what the abdication exception entails or how courts can 
determine whether abdication is occurring.41 Consequently, courts have 
 
 33 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(en banc) (per curiam)). The Court also provided other ways of rebutting the presumption of 
unreviewability that are not the subject of this Note. Id. at 832–33; see also Sunstein, supra note 25, at 
675–83 (discussing six potential arguments to rebut the presumption of unreviewability). For example, 
challengers can overcome the presumption of unreviewability by pointing to judicially manageable 
standards against which the agency nonenforcement can be judged. See, e.g., Chong v. Dir., U.S. Info. 
Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1987); Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780 F. Supp. 33, 36–38 (D.D.C. 
1992). 
 34 470 U.S. at 833 n.4. 
 35 480 F.2d 1159. 
 36 Id. at 1161–63. 
 37 Id. at 1161. 
 38 Id. at 1161–62. 
 39 Id. at 1162; see also id. at 1163 (“A consistent failure to [enforce Title VI by one of the two 
statutory means] is a dereliction of duty reviewable in the courts.”). 
 40 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985). 
 41 The Court recently missed an opportunity to clarify the doctrine in Texas v. United States, in which 
Texas and other states challenged the Department of Homeland Security’s nonenforcement of 
immigration directives under the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents (DAPA) program. The state used the concept of abdication in two ways: (1) to bolster its 
argument that it had standing (“abdication standing”) and (2) to argue that the agency’s refusal to enforce 
was reviewable. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 636–43, 662–63 (S.D. Tex. 2015). The 
district court held both that Texas had standing and that DAPA constituted complete abdication 
warranting judicial review of the agency’s nonenforcement. See id. at 643. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015). But see id. at 200–01 (King, J., dissenting) 
112:1171 (2018) Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication 
1179 
differed in how they interpret what amounts to reviewable abdication. As 
Part II describes, most courts and scholars have interpreted abdication to 
indicate only complete nonenforcement. A few courts, including the D.C. 
Circuit, require a general enforcement policy before reviewing an agency’s 
nonenforcement decision, as discussed in Part III. Lastly, Part IV details how 
a handful of courts have used a severe underenforcement approach. 
II. NONENFORCEMENT AS ABDICATION 
In an attempt to rebut Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability of 
refusals to enforce, litigants have argued that agencies have abdicated their 
statutory responsibilities. In response, most courts have adopted a total 
nonenforcement approach to abdication and rejected these arguments using 
three interrelated rationales. Moreover, scholars have similarly interpreted 
the abdication exception as capturing only total nonenforcement. Both the 
courts and scholars, however, have misread Chaney. 
A. In the Courts 
Generally, courts have legitimized the abdication exception’s potential 
to rebut Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability42 but have refused to find 
it applicable in most cases.43 Their reasoning in doing so falls into three 
overlapping and interrelated categories: (1) the agency is still at least 
minimally enforcing the statute, (2) the agency has not announced a general 
policy of nonenforcement, and (3) the agency has complete discretion 
because there are no relevant statutory guidelines. Courts often use a mix of 
the above rationales. Each rationale demonstrates that most courts have 
 
(arguing that it was not clear that the agency was doing nothing to enforce the federal immigration laws). 
The Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided vote and denied rehearing. United States v. Texas, 
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016) (mem.). 
 42 See, e.g., Mont. Air Chapter No. 29, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, v. FLRA, 898 F.2d 753, 756 
(9th Cir. 1990). But in two cases, courts have focused on the specific language of Chaney, as the Court 
stated that it “express[ed] no opinion on whether such [abdication] decisions would be unreviewable,” 
470 U.S. at 833 n.4, in rejecting the abdication exception. See Hi-Tech Bed Sys. Corp. v. U.S. Gen. Servs. 
Admin., No. 11-CV-293-S, 2012 WL 12871622, at *6 (D. Wyo. Mar. 8, 2012); Am. Disabled for 
Attendant Programs Today v. HUD, No. CIV. A. 96-5881, 1998 WL 113802, at *3 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
12, 1998), aff’d, 170 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 43 See, e.g., California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997). A few courts have 
ultimately found that agency nonenforcement is reviewable under similar reasoning as the total 
nonenforcement approach but have failed to cite the abdication exception. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. 
Co. v. FERC, 782 F.2d 730, 745 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Commission can[not] essentially abandon its 
regulatory function of ensuring just, reasonable, and preferential rates to Natural under the guise of 
unreviewable agency inaction.”); Jones v. Comptroller of the Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.D.C. 
1997) (“Judicial review is available under the APA, however, with respect to plaintiff’s allegation that 
the OCC has failed generally and programmatically to fulfill the mandate of [the statute].”), aff’d, No. 
97-5341, 1998 WL 315581 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1998) (per curiam). 
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interpreted the abdication exception to implicate only nonenforcement and 
not severe underenforcement. 
For instance, in Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins,44 the Second Circuit relied 
on the first rationale. Riverkeeper requested that the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) take certain actions regarding two nuclear power plants, 
fearing potential terrorist attacks.45 The agency refused to take action.46 
Subsequently, the court rejected Riverkeeper’s contention that the abdication 
exception applied.47 The court reasoned that, although the agency refused 
Riverkeeper’s specific requests,48 the NRC had otherwise acted to fulfill its 
general statutory duty of adequately protecting public health and safety.49 
Moreover, the court incorporated aspects of the second rationale in its 
reasoning because it was not willing to find an express “NRC policy not to 
consider potential terrorist attacks by airborne vehicles” based on pre-
September 11 documents.50 Because that did not amount to a policy, the 
Second Circuit found that there was no “NRC policy expressly abdicating 
any relevant statutory responsibility.”51 
As in Riverkeeper, courts have commonly employed the second 
rationale to find that the agency has not adopted a general policy of 
nonenforcement, and it thus did not completely abdicate its duties. Courts 
usually refuse to read a general nonenforcement policy into a few 
occurrences of nonenforcement or unofficial agency representations, 
including documents.52 This is especially true when the agency itself 
disclaims having a general nonenforcement policy. In People for the Ethical 
 
 44 359 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 45 Id. at 158. 
 46 Id. at 163. 
 47 Id. at 166–71. 
 48 Id. at 169. 
 49 Id. at 168. The court further noted that finding abdication every time the agency “decline[d] to 
order demanded action” would undermine Chaney. See id. at 169 (“[I]n thus shutting the front door to 
federal courts, [the Court] did not mean to open a back door . . . . Such an exception to the rule that failure 
to institute an enforcement action is generally not reviewable would threaten to devour the rule.”). 
 For examples of other courts using this first rationale, see, e.g., Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1084 
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1412 (10th Cir. 1990); Mass. Pub. Interest 
Research Grp., Inc. v. NRC, 852 F.2d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 1988); Gillis v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
759 F.2d 565, 578–79 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 50 Riverkeeper, 359 F.3d at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51 Id. at 166. 
 52 Unofficial agency documents are perhaps those that do not have the force of law and do not receive 
Chevron deference, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (finding that classification 
rulings, along with “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines,” are “beyond the Chevron pale”) (internal quotation marks omitted), although the courts are 
imprecise in describing what makes a document unofficial in this context. 
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Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,53 for example, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia refused to infer a general policy 
of nonenforcement from the agency officials’ decade-long repeated 
assertions that avian abuse did not fall within their jurisdiction under the 
Animal Welfare Act (AWA).54 The court instead looked to the agency’s 
promulgated rules and regulations, which it found evinced intent to enforce 
the AWA as to birds.55 Similarly, in NAACP v. Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development,56 the First Circuit found that several individual grant 
denials did not rise to the level of a general policy or practice.57 Like in 
Riverkeeper, courts sometimes treat the first rationale of partial enforcement 
as a subset of the second: by even infrequently enforcing the statutory or 
regulatory duties, the agency demonstrated that it had not adopted a general 
nonenforcement policy.58 
Moreover, as a vague catchall, courts in several different circumstances 
have found that the agency maintains complete discretion and, thus, any 
efforts at enforcement not precluded by the statute foreclose the use of the 
abdication exception.59 For some courts, this third rationale is especially 
conclusory.60 Other courts reason that if there are no specific duties in the 
statute that can be used to judge the action, there are no statutory 
responsibilities to abdicate.61 In doing so, courts have consistently noted the 
 
 53 7 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (mem.). 
 54 Id. at 12. 
 55 Id. D.C. Circuit cases have sometimes used this rationale when specifically addressing the 
abdication exception, rather than just using the general enforcement policy approach detailed in Part III. 
See, e.g., Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, v. FLRA, 283 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
agency’s two rulings about responsibilities were not enough to show a policy of nonenforcement severe 
enough to trigger the abdication exception). 
 56 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 57 See id. at 159. 
 58 See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the court 
could find abdication “only if [the NRC] has established a policy not to protect . . . public health and 
safety,” and foreclosing such a finding by listing the various measures the NRC took to that end). 
 59 See, e.g., Garcia v. McCarthy, 649 F. App’x 589, 592 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that the abdication 
exception did not apply to EPA’s delay in implementing regulation but instead that “this case centers . . . 
around EPA’s interpretation of its own enforcement duties under Title VI, a matter committed to its 
discretion by law”); Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 500–01 (D. Conn. 2006) (“[This] 
policy disagreement can hardly be labeled an abdication of the Secretary’s responsibilities.”). 
 60 See, e.g., California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he allegations 
asserted in the instant Complaint do not rise to a level that would indicate such an abdication.”). 
 61 See Va. Beach Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Reich, 881 F. Supp. 1059, 1072 (E.D. Va. 1995); 
Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334, 1340–41 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 
1995). Some courts have gotten around this by applying the abdication exception to regulatory or other 
responsibilities. See infra notes 150, 168 and accompanying text. 
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sentiment that “[r]eal or perceived inadequate enforcement of . . . laws does 
not constitute a reviewable abdication of duty.”62 
Each of these three rationales stem from these courts’ conceptualization 
of the abdication exception as encompassing only total agency 
nonenforcement. In other words, reasoning that any enforcement action 
disqualifies challengers from using the abdication exception because there is 
minimal enforcement signifies that courts view the abdication exception as 
only applying when there is no enforcement at all. For this large majority of 
courts, underenforcement—no matter how severe—does not fall within the 
reach of the abdication exception. 
Likewise, as in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, courts’ 
practice of refusing to infer adoption of a general policy from repeated 
agency representations or refusals to enforce effectively requires agencies to 
completely stop enforcing the relevant provisions to satisfy the abdication 
exception. Only then can a court easily discern a general policy amounting 
to abdication. This might include absolutely no enforcement of the statutory 
provisions or the adoption of a general nonenforcement policy. Neither 
possibility captures severe underenforcement. 
Lastly, the widespread adoption of the complete nonenforcement 
approach is reflected by decisions that suggest the agency retains 
enforcement discretion when there are no clear responsibilities. As with 
weak enforcement, if the agency exercises that discretion, a court cannot 
review its refusals to enforce. Requiring specific statutory responsibilities 
that the agency is ignoring or bypassing is more likely to capture total 
nonenforcement than severe underenforcement. These courts do not even 
examine whether there is underenforcement more generally. Therefore, no 
matter the rationale, most courts have been interpreting abdication to mean 
only complete nonenforcement. 
B. In the Literature 
In addition to courts, scholars have interpreted Chaney’s abdication 
exception as implicating only total nonenforcement. For instance, Daniel 
Deacon described the abdication exception as the Chaney exception “with 
perhaps the most limited reach.”63 Deacon noted that “the exception has 
remained quite limited” because the exception seems to require that agencies 
“abandon[] enforcement in an entire area,” which they will rarely do.64 
 
 62 Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 63 Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 804 
(2010). 
 64 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Essentially, Deacon describes the abdication exception as requiring an 
agency to stop enforcing statutory provisions completely. 
Deacon is not alone. For instance, Professor Cass Sunstein, writing not 
long after the Court decided Chaney, found that an agency announcing that 
it will no longer enforce a statute satisfies the abdication exception because 
that agency action is “contrary to the will of the legislature that enacted the 
statute.”65 But Sunstein argued that an agency’s “isolated failure[s] to act” do 
not lead to the same conclusion.66 Moreover, according to Sunstein, refusal 
to act in a large number of cases may not be enough to form the pattern of 
nonenforcement contemplated by the abdication exception.67 While Sunstein 
seemed to consider that courts could perhaps infer a pattern of 
nonenforcement by comparing the number of cases in which the agency 
refused to enforce against the total statutory jurisdiction of the agency,68 he 
concluded that it was ultimately too difficult to tell “whether a particular case 
falls in the category of ‘abdication’ or of isolated refusal to act.”69 In a later 
work, Sunstein and Professor Adrian Vermeule examined the abdication 
exception in the context of a temporary moratorium on enforcing 
discretionary duties and found that a temporary abandonment of those duties 
did not satisfy the abdication exception—more was needed.70 In other words, 
complete nonenforcement was needed. 
Two other scholars went so far as to locate the total nonenforcement 
requirement in the Court’s reasoning in Chaney. Donald Levy and Debra 
Duncan noted that inherent in Chaney’s reasoning was the assertion that an 
 
 65 Sunstein, supra note 25, at 678. 
 66 Id. at 678–79. 
 67 Id. at 679. Other scholars have made similar observations. See, e.g., Bradley E. Markano, Enabling 
State Deregulation of Marijuana Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 
305–06 (2015) (finding that the abdication exception does not apply when there is a “simple and 
nonmandatory shift in the priorities of federal prosecutors”). 
 68 Sunstein, supra note 25, at 679. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies Defer Decisions, 
103 GEO. L.J. 157, 193 (2014); cf. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully 
Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 235–36 (2015) (“[T]he decision to defer deportations 
by itself is not enough to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Sunstein and Vermeule ultimately argued for an anti-abdication principle, like that 
established in Chaney, that applies to all agency action, not just enforcement. See Sunstein & Vermeule, 
supra, at 185–89. According to them, agency inaction poses serious separation of powers concerns. See 
id. at 186 (“Suppose that a statute gives the agency discretion to make decisions whether to decide, and 
that the agency offers valid reasons—related to resource allocation and priority setting—for deferring the 
relevant decisions. Suppose also, however, that the agency repeatedly gives those same reasons, 
constantly moving the decision to the back of the queue. Over time, the consequence will be that the 
statutory scheme is effectively nullified, in practice if not openly.”); see also infra Section IV.B.2 
(discussing similar concerns). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1184 
agency’s decision not to enforce “cannot be arbitrary or capricious unless it 
amounts to a complete abdication of the agency’s statutory obligations.”71 
While they viewed abdication as encompassing total nonenforcement, they 
ultimately disagreed with the Court’s reasoning and decision to establish the 
presumption of unreviewability in the first place.72 Daniel Stepanicich 
similarly noted that enforcement actions that fall short of a policy of ignoring 
a statutory mandate but are more than a one-shot decision do not qualify for 
the abdication exception.73 Based on this understanding that the abdication 
exception requires total nonenforcement, several scholars have determined 
that it will rarely be effective in rebutting Chaney’s presumption of 
unreviewability.74 
Professor Zachary Price engaged in a more nuanced analysis of what 
the abdication exception entails.75 Price identified the essential problem with 
abdication as one of “unmanageable line-drawing.”76 He argued that 
nonenforcement falls along a spectrum and it is unclear how much abdication 
Chaney prohibits.77 Furthermore, he accepted that agencies will never be able 
to enforce every statute fully due to lack of resources and natural 
prioritization, such as prioritizing more serious crimes.78 Price ultimately 
rejected the utility of the abdication exception and argued instead for a 
political question approach to issues of nonenforcement and 
underenforcement.79 In doing so, Price ultimately accepted the complete 
 
 71 Donald M. Levy, Jr., & Debra Jean Duncan, Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking and 
Enforcement Discretion: The Effect of a Presumption of Unreviewability, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 
627 n.214 (1987). 
 72 See id. (noting that an agency’s rescission of one of its regulations is reviewable even though this 
does not amount to abdication and suggesting that a similar standard should govern nonenforcement). 
 73 Daniel Stepanicich, Comment, Presidential Inaction and the Constitutional Basis for Executive 
Nonenforcement Discretion, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1507, 1534 (2016). 
 74 See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 63, at 804 (“[P]laintiffs alleging a pattern of agency inaction will 
have a hard time proving that the pattern amounts to a conscious and express abdication of an agency’s 
statutory responsibility.”). 
 75 See Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571, 
1615–16 (2016) [hereinafter Price, Law Enforcement]. 
 76 Id. at 1616. This is similar to the position that Sunstein and Vermeule took when they stated that 
the abdication exception is “admittedly vague and not easily subject to judicial administration.” Sunstein 
& Vermeule, supra note 70, at 162. 
 77 Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 75, at 1616. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 1617 (“[Chaney]’s abdication principle will rarely provide a principled way out of the 
problem of judicial unmanageability with respect to nonenforcement.”). The political question doctrine 
recognizes “that some legal obligations defy judicial enforcement,” and in those situations the issue is 
essentially nonjusticiable. Id. at 1587. The Supreme Court has outlined a six-factor test that governs the 
identification of political questions. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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nonenforcement interpretation of abdication as correct and rejected the 
severe underenforcement interpretation.80 
These pieces reflect the general sentiment in the literature that the 
abdication exception contemplates only total nonenforcement and not severe 
underenforcement, even as scholars have recognized that extreme 
underenforcement may present the same concerns.81 
C. Misreading Chaney 
Courts and scholars have been misreading Chaney to apply the 
abdication exception only in cases of total nonenforcement. The Court in 
Chaney did not, however, mean to preclude review when there is severe 
underenforcement. Reading the case otherwise ignores both the text 
establishing the exception and the Court’s intent, as demonstrated by its 
reference to Adams. 
First, the text in which the abdication exception has its roots discusses 
“a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has 
consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to 
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”82 This language 
does not limit the interpretation to include only complete nonenforcement. 
The phrase “a general policy that is so extreme” could include any extreme 
policy, whether total nonenforcement or severe underenforcement. 
Additionally, the adverbs “consciously” and “expressly” seem to signal that 
the agency’s intention and method in adopting this policy are important. This 
principle also applies to severe underenforcement because agencies can 
consciously and expressly choose to dramatically underenforce statutes. 
Additionally, the word “abdication” is defined as “to relinquish” or “to cast 
off” something, such as a responsibility.83 Under these definitions, severe 
underenforcement can amount to abdication. The text establishing the 
abdication exception thus does not explicitly require total enforcement. 
Second, the Chaney Court cited to Adams, which demonstrated its 
underlying intent.84 In Adams, the D.C. Circuit specifically noted that the suit 
was not challenging nonenforcement in a few school districts but rather 
 
 80 Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 75, at 1617. 
 81 See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73, 110 
(2015) (noting that deprioritizing certain enforcement actions “can have a very similar effect to 
categorical nonenforcement”). 
 82 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83 Abdicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abdicate 
[https://perma.cc/B3C8-6X6Z]. 
 84 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en 
banc) (per curiam)). 
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challenging essentially complete nonenforcement.85 In that way, Adams 
seems to suggest that the abdication exception should at least extend to total 
nonenforcement. At the same time, the court distinguished the situation in 
Adams from one in which there is a “generally effective enforcement 
program.”86 An enforcement program with severe underenforcement is 
unlikely to be generally effective because the statute is not being consistently 
enforced. The reference to Adams therefore also supports the proposition that 
the Court did not necessarily intend the abdication exception to include only 
total nonenforcement. 
Analyzing Chaney demonstrates that the abdication exception can 
plausibly include more than total nonenforcement. The Court appeared 
worried about agencies purposefully undermining statutes, which severe 
underenforcement also does. In addition, the Chaney Court was concerned 
about abdication in situations where there is no generally effective 
enforcement program. Purposeful, severe underenforcement is the opposite 
of that. Thus, courts and scholars have been misunderstanding Chaney’s 
abdication exception to preclude severe underenforcement when reviewing 
severe underenforcement might best address the Court’s concerns. 
III. GENERAL ENFORCEMENT POLICIES 
In addition to taking a total nonenforcement approach to the abdication 
exception,87 the D.C. Circuit has its own approach that exempts all general 
enforcement policies from Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability. Under 
this approach, courts can review general, official enforcement policies, just 
not single nonenforcement decisions.88 Ultimately, this approach might be 
too formalistic and strict. It creates perverse incentives for agencies to not 
 
 85 See Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162. In fact, based on the statute at issue in the case, some have argued 
that Chaney’s footnote reference to Adams is unilluminating because Adams is a pre-Chaney decision 
with potentially dubious precedential value. See Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 75, at 1616–17 
(discussing Adams and arguing it may have been the perfect, but anomalous, case for the abdication 
exception); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 60 F. Supp. 3d 
14, 18 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that Adams “ha[d] limited relevance for understanding the scope of” 
Chaney). 
 86 Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162. 
 87 See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1035–36 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting 
the argument that the EPA’s nonenforcement decision fell within the abdication exception because the 
EPA was enforcing the statute in other ways). 
 88 See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993); cf. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n 
v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that the presumption of unreviewability was 
“inapplicable or at least rebutted” in part because the National Wildlife Federation was challenging an 
interpretation of the statute rather than a “particular enforcement decision”); Int’l Union, United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Even if 
a statutory interpretation is announced in the course of a nonenforcement decision, that does not mean 
that it escapes review altogether.”). 
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adopt any enforcement policies and therefore creates potential for total 
nonenforcement and severe underenforcement. 
A. In the D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit addresses the abdication exception when it arises,89 
but it has a separate approach to agency enforcement policies more generally. 
Essentially, it has found that, while Chaney established that individual 
nonenforcement decisions are presumptively unreviewable, general and 
official enforcement policies are reviewable, regardless of whether they 
indicate potential abdication. 
In Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Peña,90 the D.C. Circuit 
explained its rationale. In Crowley, the Maritime Administrator indicated in 
correspondence with Lykes Brothers Steamship Company that it did not need 
a waiver to operate foreign-flag ships to certain ports.91 Crowley, a 
competitor, contested that Lykes did need a waiver but to no avail—the 
Administrator again refused to require a waiver for Lykes.92 Crowley sued93 
and, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that the Administrator’s decision was 
an unreviewable “single-shot non-enforcement decision.”94 Only general 
policies were reviewable, and the unofficial correspondence between the 
Administrator and Lykes was neither a general policy nor indicative of one.95 
The Crowley court distinguished general enforcement policies from 
individual decisions. First, it noted that individual enforcement proceedings 
involve “mingled assessments of fact, policy, and law . . . that are . . . 
peculiarly within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”96 General 
enforcement policies also present clearer statements of agency reasons for 
nonenforcement, whereas individual nonenforcement decisions “tend to be 
cursory, ad hoc, or post hoc.”97 Moreover, an agency’s announcement of a 
general nonenforcement policy implicates the potential applicability of the 
abdication exception because broad policies can more easily demonstrate 
 
 89 See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1, 
10–13 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 90 37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 91 Id. at 672–73. 
 92 Id. at 673. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 676 (emphasis omitted). In fact, it was unclear whether the Administrator’s determination 
was a nonenforcement decision or an advisory opinion. The court analyzed both possibilities. See id. at 
673–74. 
 95 Id. at 676–77. 
 96 Id. at 677. 
 97 Id. 
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abdication.98 Lastly, the opinion noted that courts should shy away from 
“teasing meaning out of agencies’ side comments, form letters, litigation 
documents, and informal communications.”99 
This last comment from the D.C. Circuit illustrates the fine line it has 
drawn. Consolidated and promulgated general enforcement policies are 
reviewable, such as when the policy is part of a formal regulation that 
underwent the rulemaking process100 or that articulates a universal policy 
statement.101 But documents produced for individual enforcement decisions 
are unreviewable102—even when, taken together, they might amount to a 
general policy. The exception to this approach is when a document in an 
individual nonenforcement decision “would actually lay out a general policy 
delineating the boundary between enforcement and non-enforcement and 
purport to speak to a broad class of parties.”103 No case yet has presented this 
situation. 
B. In Other Courts 
A few courts outside of the D.C. Circuit have noted its approach 
favorably.104 The most recent case discussing both Crowley and the 
abdication exception is WildEarth Guardians v. Department of Justice,105 a 
 
 98 Id. Despite this comment, the D.C. Circuit has never explicitly used the abdication exception to 
find a general enforcement policy reviewable, although it used similar reasoning (that is, searching for a 
general pattern) in Jones v. Comptroller of the Currency to review the total nonenforcement there. 983 F. 
Supp. 197, 203–04 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d, 1998 WL 315581 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1998) (per curiam) 
(concluding that the court has jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s claim that the OCC had “failed 
generally and programmatically” to administer the Fair Housing Act because the statute imposed an 
affirmative mandate on the OCC). 
 99 Crowley, 37 F.3d at 677. 
 100 For example, in National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, the EPA argued that Chaney foreclosed 
NWF’s challenge to an EPA regulation that gave the EPA discretion whether to initiate certain 
proceedings (rather than those proceedings being automatically triggered by a certain finding). 980 F.2d 
765, 772–73 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court rejected this argument in part because the NWF challenged a 
particular interpretation of the statute embodied in a regulation, rather than challenging particular 
decisions not to enforce the statute. Id. at 773. 
 101 See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 102 This was the situation in Crowley. See 37 F.3d at 676. 
 103 See id. at 677. Parties have also unsuccessfully invoked the Crowley exception in other cases. 
See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 60 F. Supp. 3d 14, 16–19 
(D.D.C. 2014) (mem.); K-V Pharm. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 889 F. Supp. 2d 119, 135–40 (D.D.C. 
2012) (mem.), vacated on other grounds, No. 12-5349, 2014 WL 68499 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 7, 2014) (per 
curiam). 
 104 So far, a total of four courts outside the D.C. Circuit have explicitly adopted Crowley’s approach. 
See, e.g., Riverkeeper v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2004); WildEarth Guardians v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 181 F. Supp. 3d 651, 665–68 (D. Ariz. 2015); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 
2d 318, 334 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014); Ringo v. 
Lombardi, 706 F. Supp. 2d 952, 959–60 (W.D. Mo. 2010). 
 105 181 F. Supp. 3d at 664–68. 
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case in the District of Arizona in which WildEarth Guardians (WEG) 
challenged the underenforcement of the ESA’s provisions—including the 
underenforcement of the taking prohibition discussed in this Note’s 
Introduction. 
The ESA allows for the listing of endangered and threatened animal 
species by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).106 Once a species is listed, 
the statute prohibits taking, possessing, and selling that endangered 
species.107 The potential penalties are steep: civil penalties range from $500 
for strict liability offenses to $12,000 for violations requiring a mens rea of 
“knowingly.”108 Criminal penalties, which all require a mens rea of 
knowingly, range from $25,000 to $50,000 and from six months to one year 
of incarceration.109 The ESA further allows for citizen suits to enjoin any 
person alleged to be in violation of the statute.110 
WildEarth Guardians stems from the consequences of an earlier case 
concerning the mens rea requirements of the ESA. In United States v. 
McKittrick,111 Chad McKittrick was convicted of unlawfully taking, 
possessing, and transporting an endangered Mexican wolf.112 He argued on 
appeal that the requisite mens rea of knowingly required specific intent—
that the government must prove that he knew the biological identity of the 
animal that he was shooting and that it was protected.113 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this interpretation and found that knowingly required only general 
 
 106 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012) (codification of Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)); see 
also Ashley Crooks et al., Environmental Crimes, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1051, 1143 (2014) (discussing 
the purposes behind ESA). 
 107 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (D)–(F) (2012). Taking is defined broadly as “to harass, harm, 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” a species. Id. § 1532(19) (2012). Both “harm” 
and “harass” have further been defined broadly, expanding the prohibition’s reach. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 
(2017). Considering the taking prohibition’s broad scope, severe penalties, and low mens rea threshold, 
prosecutorial discretion in enforcing the statute ensures that its provisions are not overprosecuted. See 
Jonathan Wood, Overcriminalization and the Endangered Species Act: Mens Rea and Criminal 
Convictions for Take, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10496 (2016). Laypeople are unlikely to be familiar with the 
approximately 1,500 listed species, and overcriminalization might constitute, for instance, prosecuting 
cases in which people stepped on insects without realizing they were protected. See id. at 10506. 
 108 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (2012). 
 109 See id. § 1540(b). 
 110 See id. § 1540(g)(1)(A). The ESA thus presents the issue that citizen suits may not be able to 
reach past violations, whereas government criminal prosecutions can. See infra notes 193–94 and 
accompanying text. 
 111 142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 112 Id. at 1172–73. 
 113 Id. at 1173. 
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intent based on the statute’s legislative history; he needed only to know that 
he was shooting an animal that turned out to be protected.114 
McKittrick subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied 
certiorari.115 The government’s brief, however, backtracked from its previous 
position and indicated that the DOJ, in future taking provision cases, would 
request jury instructions defining knowingly as requiring specific intent.116 
Soon after, the DOJ circulated a memorandum directing federal prosecutors 
to do just that.117 This policy, called the McKittrick Policy, applied to 
violations of the takings prohibition for all endangered species.118 
In WildEarth Guardians, WEG argued that the DOJ’s decisions not to 
enforce the ESA were reviewable in part because they reflected a general 
policy amounting to an abdication of statutory responsibilities.119 In 
response, the DOJ moved to dismiss, arguing that the policy was 
unreviewable and that Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability applied 
even more strongly in the criminal context.120 The court denied the DOJ’s 
 
 114 Id. at 1177. The Fifth Circuit came to the same conclusion. See United States v. Ivey, 949 F.2d 
759, 766 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990). In addition, the 
Eleventh Circuit had expressed its agreement with those cases’ reasoning. See United States v. Grigsby, 
111 F.3d 806, 817 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Newcomer et al., supra note 5, at 262–66 (discussing 
McKittrick and pre-McKittrick case law on the knowingly mens rea under the ESA). 
 115 See McKittrick v. United States, 525 U.S. 1072 (1999). 
 116 See Newcomer et al., supra note 5, at 266–67 (discussing this “strange and unexplained” change 
in the government’s position). 
 117 See id. at 267. 
 118 See id. at 269–70 (relating that due to the McKittrick policy, the shooter of a California Condor 
escaped the ESA’s harsher penalties because he would not admit that he knew he was shooting a 
California Condor during interviews, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office instead prosecuted under the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act). 
 119 See WildEarth Guardians v. Dep’t of Justice, 181 F. Supp. 3d 651, 665–68 (D. Ariz. 2015). 
Substantively, WEG alleged that the McKittrick Policy violated the APA because it was “arbitrary, 
irrational, and an express policy that completely abdicates DOJ’s responsibility to enforce the criminal 
penalties provision of the ESA.” Id. at 658. It is unclear clear whether ultimately proving the applicability 
of the abdication exception per se demonstrates that the policy is arbitrary and capricious under the APA, 
although this may be the case. See Levy & Duncan, supra note 71, at 627 (noting that Chaney’s abdication 
exception relies on the reasoning that abdications are per se arbitrary and capricious). 
 Of note is that while the district court in WildEarth Guardians seemed to be adopting Crowley’s 
general policy approach, it also did a statutory analysis that better reflects the rationale that enforcement 
is not totally committed to agency discretion. See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 666 
(“Either way, the Court looks to the statute to determine whether the presumption of non-reviewability 
has been rebutted.”). Still, the court facially relied upon the general policy exception, see id. at 668 (“The 
DOJ admittedly authorizes and carries out enforcement actions pursuant to the McKittrick policy . . . .”), 
even if the analysis was at times muddled, see id. at 667 (“The Court finds that DOJ’s actions, including 
the adoption of a formal discretionary non-enforcement policy, are subject to ESA guidelines.”). 
 120 Id. at 658, 664. Another ground on which the DOJ moved to dismiss was that WEG lacked 
standing. Id. at 659–60. The plaintiffs here also used the “abdication standing” argument from Texas v. 
United States. See supra note 41. The premise of abdication standing is when an agency has abdicated its 
duty, the plaintiff has standing to challenge whether the agency has exceeded its statutory power. See 
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motion and held that the suit was not barred by Chaney, finding that 
prosecutorial discretion “does not include the power to disregard statutory 
obligations that apply to the Executive Branch.”121 
According to the court, WEG’s allegations rebutted Chaney’s 
presumption of unreviewability.122 The DOJ’s actions and the McKittrick 
Policy qualified for the abdication exception because the DOJ ignored its 
obligations under the ESA.123 The Final Rule for implementing the listing of 
the Mexican wolf envisioned vigorous enforcement as “the cornerstone to 
preventing illegal killings [which were] the single biggest threat to the 
Mexican gray wolf reintroduction program.”124 The McKittrick Policy and 
the DOJ’s low number of prosecutions did not align with the Final Rule and 
underlying public welfare statutory scheme.125 Together, these demonstrated 
potential abdication, and the court further indicated that the McKittrick 
Policy might be a general enforcement policy reviewable under Crowley.126 
The DOJ later moved for summary judgment, and the district court 
again found that the agency action was reviewable because the McKittrick 
Policy “[wa]s outside the range of prosecutorial authority set out in ESA’s 
comprehensive conservation scheme.”127 In fact, the court found that the 
McKittrick Policy incorrectly interpreted the ESA and that by adopting it, 
the DOJ had abdicated its statutory responsibility.128 Thus, without even 
 
WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 662–63 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). 
It was unclear what role this played in the WildEarth Guardians court’s holding that the plaintiffs had 
standing because the court still conducted a full standing analysis. See id. at 659–63. Still, considering 
how standing requirements preclude citizen suits, see infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text, this 
may be a developing avenue to satisfy standing in these situations. 
 121 WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 665. According to the court, prosecutorial discretion 
“only encompasses the Executive Branch’s power to decide whether to initiate charges for legal 
wrongdoing and to seek punishment, penalties, or sanctions.” Id. 
 122 Id. at 667–68. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 661. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See id. at 665 (“Plaintiffs’ challenge fits within the door left open in [Chaney] because Plaintiffs 
allege the DOJ has formally expressed a general policy of non-enforcement: the McKittrick policy.” 
(citation omitted)). But whether the district court ultimately found that the McKittrick Policy is a general 
enforcement policy is somewhat unclear. For more on the court’s confusing mix of rationales, see supra 
note 119. 
 127 WildEarth Guardians v. Dep’t of Justice, No. CV-13-00392, 2017 WL 4708022, at *7 (D. Ariz. 
June 21, 2017). 
 128 See id. at *24 (“[T]he DOJ has abdicated its statutory responsibility by adopting the McKittrick 
policy which precludes, without discretion, prosecutions for mistakenly and/or carelessly taking, i.e., 
shooting, a wolf.”). 
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relying on Crowley’s approach, the district court thus granted summary 
judgment for WEG on that count.129 
There are two takeaways from WildEarth Guardians. The first is that 
courts outside the D.C. Circuit have sometimes adopted Crowley’s rule and 
reasoning that general enforcement policies are per se reviewable. Second, 
the approach that the court used for the abdication exception analysis was 
not total enforcement but severe underenforcement. Even though the DOJ 
did not totally stop enforcing the takings prohibition, did not adopt a policy 
of total nonenforcement, and inherently had high levels of prosecutorial 
discretion in the criminal context, the court still held that the abdication 
exception applied. 
C. Downsides of Requiring a General Policy 
At first, the D.C. Circuit’s approach seems to capture more situations 
than the total nonenforcement and severe underenforcement approaches. 
Under it, courts can review all general enforcement policies, regardless of 
whether they evince any nonenforcement or underenforcement. This 
approach poses three distinct issues, however. 
First, this approach does not greatly expand what courts can review 
under the APA. Agencies rarely promulgate official general enforcement 
policies in the way that the Crowley court contemplated. Additionally, the 
approach dictates that unofficial agency communications, such as those 
connected with individual enforcement decisions, generally cannot establish 
such policies, further decreasing the chances of there being a reviewable 
policy.130 As long as an agency does not officially adopt a policy through 
rulemaking or other means, its enforcement policies will generally remain 
unreviewable. But courts can use both the Crowley approach and a severe 
underenforcement approach, like the WildEarth Guardians court did,131 
which might ameliorate this concern. 
This approach is further limited because when there is a general 
enforcement policy, review is seemingly limited to whether the agency has 
properly construed the relevant statute.132 For example, in OSG Bulk Ships, 
Inc. v. United States, the D.C. Circuit found that the Maritime 
 
 129 See id. at *1. In doing so, the district court seemed to assume that an abdication of statutory 
responsibility was per se arbitrary and capricious. See also supra note 119. 
 130 See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text; see also K-V Pharm. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
889 F. Supp. 2d 119, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that a letter connected to an individual enforcement 
decision did not indicate a general enforcement policy). 
 131 See supra Section III.B. 
 132 See, e.g., OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 808, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Edison Elec. 
Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Roane v. Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216, 226–27 (D.D.C. 
2009); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 171–72 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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Administration’s longstanding interpretation of a statute was a general 
enforcement policy.133 In reviewing the policy, however, the court conducted 
a deferential Chevron analysis.134 Under Chevron deference, with which 
courts examine the reasonableness of an agency’s statutory interpretation,135 
a general enforcement policy that amounts to total nonenforcement or severe 
underenforcement may still be reasonable due to the high amount of 
deference, and thus this approach does not guard against them. 
Second, this approach creates a perverse incentive for agencies not to 
adopt general enforcement policies, which can be beneficial in guiding both 
the agency and industries. Because courts using the general policy approach 
will review all enforcement policies—regardless of whether they constitute 
total nonenforcement, severe underenforcement, or neither—under this 
approach, agencies suddenly have an incentive not to adopt any enforcement 
policies at all. This may lead to a lack of uniformity and clarity in 
enforcement policies because even internal directives like the McKittrick 
Policy may qualify as reviewable general enforcement policies. 
Third, the D.C. Circuit’s approach seems inconsistent with the Court’s 
concerns in Chaney. True, the Court used the phrase “general policy.”136 But 
it did so only in the context of a general policy amounting to abdication.137 
The Court also did not specify that such a policy had to come from official 
agency documents. In fact, there were no such documents in Adams v. 
Richardson, to which the Court cited. That policy was unannounced.138 So 
while general policies may be reviewable for other reasons, the Court 
demonstrated that, in Chaney, it was distinctly concerned with agencies 
effectively halting enforcement efforts.139 So, although the general 
enforcement policy approach potentially reaches new activity and might 
vindicate other important policies, it is not a viable substitute for a severe 
underenforcement or even a total nonenforcement approach. 
IV. UNDERENFORCEMENT AS ABDICATION 
While most courts have taken the approach that abdication includes 
only total nonenforcement, a few have interpreted abdication more 
expansively. These courts found that severe underenforcement also qualifies 
 
 133 See 132 F.3d at 812. The agency consistently referenced the policy in its letters and other 
representations to various parties. Id. at 811. 
 134 See id. at 812. 
 135 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984). 
 136 See 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985). 
 137 See id. 
 138 See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 139 See supra Section II.C. 
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as abdication. To explore this, Section IV.A first describes these cases and 
explains how they reflect the severe underenforcement approach. Next, 
Section IV.B details how severe underenforcement poses just as many 
pressing concerns as total nonenforcement. Section IV.B.1 examines how 
severe underenforcement harms certain complex statutory schemes, whereas 
Section IV.B.2 discusses the pressing constitutional and balance-of-powers 
concerns implicated by severe underenforcement. Lastly, Section IV.C 
argues that courts should interpret abdication to include severe 
underenforcement and explores how they might do so. 
A. In the Courts 
In interpreting what amounts to abdication, a few courts have looked 
beyond whether there is total nonenforcement to see whether an agency is 
engaging in severe underenforcement. These courts have been more willing 
to infer a general policy amounting to abdication from patterns of agencies’ 
nonenforcement decisions, even if those decisions are relatively rare. 
An example is Roman v. Korson,140 in which migrant farm workers sued 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), alleging that the 
USDA had failed to enforce labor housing regulations with notice-and-
comment and rollback provisions.141 The farm workers argued that the 
USDA’s consistent failure to enforce these provisions amounted to 
abdication,142 and the USDA argued that there was no abdication because it 
had enforced some provisions.143 The agency, however, had enforced the 
rollback provisions just once in eight years144 and seemingly never enforced 
the notice-and-comment requirements for borrowers.145 Furthermore, there 
were no ongoing attempts at enforcement.146 Thus, the court found that the 
USDA’s policies appeared “to be to not enforce the rebate and rollback 
provisions for fear that they will cause economic hardships on borrowers.”147 
The court therefore rejected the USDA’s arguments and held that, because 
the USDA “failed in a systematic way to enforce its mandatory 
regulations,”148 the agency’s nonenforcement decisions were reviewable.149 
 
 140 918 F. Supp. 1108 (W.D. Mich. 1995). 
 141 Id. at 1110. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 1110–11. 
 144 Id. at 1113. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. (emphasis added). 
 148 Id. at 1114. 
 149 Id. at 1112–13. The court extended the abdication theory to duties established by regulation in 
addition to those established by statute. See id. at 1112 (citing to decisions from the First, Third, Sixth, 
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Roman contrasts with cases handled under the total nonenforcement 
approach. For a court using the complete nonenforcement approach, 
enforcing the statute just once may have been enough to disqualify 
challengers from accessing the abdication exception, even if there were no 
ongoing attempts at enforcement. The Roman court emphasized, however, 
that enforcing the statute at least once is not enough to escape the 
applicability of the abdication exception.150 The court went beyond the total 
nonenforcement approach to find that the agency had abdicated its duties 
because it had severely underenforced its regulatory responsibilities. 
Another example is Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service.151 There, 
the Forest Service was required to review and authorize the transportation of 
“mega-loads” on a highway crossing Nez Perce Tribe reservation lands,152 
which included consultation with the Tribe.153 When a company informed the 
Forest Service that it intended to transport a load before any review was 
completed, however, the Forest Service did nothing,154 even though it knew 
the planned date for the shipment and received a phone call from the Nez 
Perce Tribal Chairman about enforcement.155 The load passed unimpeded.156 
The Nez Perce Tribe sued, arguing that the agency action was reviewable 
because the Forest Service clearly abdicated their statutory responsibility in 
failing to stop the load before it could consult the Tribe.157 The court found 
that this was a reviewable abdication of the Forest Service’s statutory 
duties.158 
 
and D.C. Circuits recognizing that “regulations can serve as a basis for judicial review of agency 
enforcement decisions”). 
 150 Id. at 1113. 
 151 No. 3:13-CV-348-BLW, 2013 WL 5212317 (D. Idaho Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Nez Perce 
Tribe I). 
 152 Id. at *2–3. 
 153 Id. at *3. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at *4. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at *6. Interestingly, the parties did not even raise the abdication exception in their pleadings. 
See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nez Perce Tribe I, 2013 WL 
5213340 (D. Idaho Sept. 6, 2013); United States Forest Service’s Answer to First Amended Complaint, 
Nez Perce Tribe I, 2013 WL 5985245 (D. Idaho Oct. 31, 2013). On a motion for reconsideration by 
intervenor Resources Conservation Company International (RCCI), RCCI raised the issue of the 
abdication exception to argue that it did not apply. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant–Intervenor 
RCCI’s Expedited Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, to Stay Injunction Pending Appeal at 9–
11, Nez Perce Tribe, 2013 WL 5442226 (D. Idaho Sept. 20, 2013). The court, however, denied 
reconsideration. See Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 3:13-CV-348-BLW, 2013 WL 5592765 
(D. Idaho Oct. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Nez Perce Tribe II) (failing to address RCCI’s argument about 
Chaney). RCCI later stipulated to dismissal, see Stipulation of Dismissal, Nez Perce Tribe, 2013 WL 
6778549 (D. Idaho Dec. 17, 2013), and so these issues were never reviewed on appeal. 
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The court’s comments in Nez Perce Tribe demonstrate how the court 
used a severe underenforcement approach. Rather than challenging a 
seemingly consistent failure to enforce a statute, the plaintiffs challenged the 
agency’s singular failure to halt Omega–Morgan’s shipment.159 Moreover, 
the Forest Service was attempting to complete a corridor study and consult 
with the Tribe, so it had partially enforced the statute.160 The Nez Perce Tribe 
court, however, dismissed these reasons for why the abdication exception 
should not apply. Under a total nonenforcement approach, this would likely 
have disqualified the Tribe from accessing the abdication exception. But the 
Tribe was not disqualified, demonstrating that the court interpreted 
abdication as severe underenforcement. 
Whitaker v. Clementon Housing Authority161 is another case in which 
the reviewing court found that an agency refusing to enforce in one situation 
was sufficient abdication.162 Whitaker sued the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), alleging that HUD failed to enforce certain 
rules it promulgated in a handbook, which resulted in Whitaker being evicted 
and disqualified from Section 8 subsidization.163 In response, HUD argued 
that its decision not to enforce those regulations was unreviewable under 
Chaney.164 The court rejected that argument, holding instead that HUD’s 
nonenforcement decisions were reviewable.165 Not only did HUD fail to take 
enforcement action, but it also “discouraged plaintiff from seeking 
enforcement of her rights elsewhere.”166 That reflected a general policy 
amounting to a reviewable abdication of HUD’s responsibilities.167 
 
 159 See Nez Perce Tribe I, 2013 WL 5212317, at *2–4. 
 160 See id. at *4. 
 161 788 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1992). 
 162 See id. at 231–32. While the court ultimately seemed to find a judicially manageable standard by 
which to judge HUD’s actions, see id. at 232 (finding a directive in the HUD handbook to be a “clear[] 
constraint on agency discretion”), it first found that “[t]o the extent that [HUD’s actions] reflect[ed] a 
general policy ‘consciously and expressly adopted,’” constituting an abdication of HUD’s statutory 
responsibilities, then “HUD’s decision in this matter is of a type that was specifically excluded from the 
scope of the Chaney holding by the Supreme Court,” id. at 231. While the ultimate holding—HUD’s 
actions are reviewable—is clear, it is unclear whether the court viewed these as alternate (and 
independent) or dependent holdings. 
 163 Id. at 228. 
 164 Id. at 228–29. 
 165 Id. at 231–32 (noting that “the Third Circuit appears to generally view the barrier to reviewability 
erected by Chaney as minimal”). 
 166 Id. at 231. 
 167 Id. The court’s willingness to interpret abdication more broadly is also seen in the fact that it used 
an unofficial handbook as a standard against which to measure the agency action. Id. at 229–30. This was 
based on the reasoning that some courts had held that HUD handbooks can be binding on the agency in 
certain circumstances and because the handbook reflected statutory principles. Id. at 229 (citing 
Burroughs v. Hills, 564 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1983)). 
112:1171 (2018) Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication 
1197 
The court in Whitaker also adopted a type of severe underenforcement 
approach. It was willing to infer a general policy from just one incident of 
nonenforcement that it considered severe. The court did not even discuss 
whether the agency had enforced its duties more generally. Its reasoning was 
based on how the plaintiff made multiple requests of HUD and how HUD 
failed to enforce each time.168 That sufficed to demonstrate a general policy 
amounting to abdication. Under a total nonenforcement approach, though, 
not enforcing its duties as to just one person would not suffice. 
These three cases are incompatible with the complete nonenforcement 
approach. Instead, they better reflect the severe underenforcement approach. 
These courts’ approaches allowed review of more nonenforcement decisions 
than is permitted under the approaches of most courts. For instance, under 
this approach, a case like PETA may have qualified for the abdication 
exception because the agency had refused to enforce the statute in question 
multiple times.169 The three courts here went beyond examining whether the 
agency had totally halted enforcement of a statute and examined whether it 
had severely underenforced the statute to achieve substantially the same 
effect. 
It is unclear why these courts, as well as the courts in Adams and 
WildEarth Guardians, chose to adopt the severe underenforcement 
approach. One theory might be that the plaintiffs were all seemingly 
vulnerable and sympathetic. In Adams, which occurred against the backdrop 
of a highly charged period of racial tension, the nonenforcement involved 
funding segregated schools.170 WildEarth Guardians involved endangered 
Mexican grey wolves that cannot politically or legally defend themselves.171 
In Roman, the challengers were migrant farm workers, a group that 
historically has had little legal or political power.172 As for Nez Perce Tribe, 
the Native American tribes have occupied an uneasy ground between 
 
 168 Id. at 228. 
 169 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animas  v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 
2013); see also supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 170 See Adams v. Richards, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164–65 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also supra notes 36–40 
and accompanying text. 
 171 See supra Section III.B for a discussion of the WildEarth Guardians case. Admittedly, the 
WildEarth Guardians case does not fit as well into this analysis as the other cases because the other cases 
involve human plaintiffs who were potentially harmed by the agency decision not to enforce. 
 172 See supra notes 141–51 and accompanying text. For more information on the political and legal 
issues surrounding migrant farm workers, see generally Michael A. Celone, Comment, Undocumented 
and Unprotected: Solutions for Protecting the Health of America’s Undocumented Mexican Migrant 
Workers, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 117 (2012); Jane Younglove Lapp, Comment, The Migrant 
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act: “Rumors of My Death Have Been Greatly 
Exaggerated,” 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 173 (1993); Viviana Patino, Migrant Farm Worker 
Advocacy: Empowering the Invisible Laborer, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (1987). 
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sovereigns and subjects, resulting in difficulty in protecting their lands and 
resources.173 Lastly, Whitaker featured a woman with a young son who was 
evicted three years prior and still could not afford an apartment without 
Section 8 subsidization.174 Perhaps seeing the tangible impact of 
underenforcement highlighted to these courts that severe underenforcement 
poses many of the same dangers as total nonenforcement. 
B. Severe Underenforcement’s Consequences 
First, like total nonenforcement, an agency’s severe underenforcement 
of a statute implicates the Chaney Court’s concerns: it can sap the strength 
of statutes that agencies are congressionally mandated to enforce.175 The 
consequences of severe underenforcement are especially dire when agencies 
underenforce complex statutory schemes with overlapping civil and criminal 
penalties, and that are dependent on the federal government for full 
enforcement. Thus, Section IV.B.1 discusses those characteristics in the 
context of environmental law as an example. Section IV.B.2 then explores 
the potential constitutional separation of powers and pragmatic balance of 
powers concerns that severe underenforcement poses. 
1. Harms to Complex Statutory Schemes 
Severe underenforcement can cripple complex statutory schemes, 
especially those with two common characteristics. The first is complex and 
overlapping provisions—underenforcing one provision can impair the others 
and their deterrent effect. This is especially the case in statutes that provide 
both civil and criminal penalties. The second characteristic is heavy 
dependence upon federal enforcement, such as when the federal scheme 
preempts state law or when citizen-suit provisions are nonexistent or 
ineffective. In these cases, there are few other measures to rectify federal 
underenforcement. 
Environmental statutes frequently feature both characteristics and serve 
as a useful illustration. First, many environmental statutes, like the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 
 
 173 See supra notes 152–59 and accompanying text. For more information on the legal status of 
Native American tribes, see CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 577–79 (2d ed. 
2009). In fact, in Nez Perce Tribe, the court emphasized the unique trustee relationship between the 
federal government and Native American tribes. Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 3:13-CV-
348-BLW, 2013 WL 5212317, at *5–6 (D. Idaho Sept. 12, 2013). 
 174 Whitaker v. Clemington Hous. Auth., 788 F. Supp. 226, 227–28 (D.N.J. 1992); see also supra 
notes 162–69 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra Section II.C. 
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provide for overlapping civil and criminal penalties.176 Severely 
underenforcing a single provision can diminish the deterrent effects of entire 
statutory schemes. The effectiveness of these statutes depends, in part, on 
robust enforcement of the statutes’ penalties to deter parties from violating 
them. This is especially true for criminal violations. 
Criminal prosecutions generally require prosecutorial discretion: 
prosecutors must consider complex factors in determining how to best 
allocate limited resources.177 For example, the DOJ considers several factors 
when deciding whether to prosecute under criminal provisions of 
environmental statutes.178 Because that kind of judgment involves inherent 
prosecutorial discretion, courts are loath to question their decisions.179 Only 
in rare circumstances will courts interfere with them.180 Moreover, 
questioning prosecutorial decisions may inappropriately reveal enforcement 
patterns, facilitating the ability of actors to escape enforcement.181 
But in the context of environmental statutes, too much discretion can 
undercut entire statutory schemes. Criminal penalties under most 
 
 176 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b)–(c), (g) (2012) (CWA allowing the Administrator to commence civil 
actions and providing criminal penalties for knowing violations); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (g) (2012) (RCRA 
providing criminal penalties for knowing violations and allowing the Administrator to further seek civil 
penalties); see also Crooks et al., supra note 106, at 1054 & n.12 (discussing overlapping penalties in 
environmental statutes). 
 177 See Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 32, at 681–82. This is especially true considering 
the increasingly overlapping nature of federal crimes with each other and with state crimes. See id. 
 178 See Crooks et al., supra note 106, at 1056–57. This includes (a) voluntary disclosure, (b) 
cooperation, (c) preventative measures and compliance programs, (d) pervasiveness of noncompliance, 
(e) internal disciplinary action, and (f) subsequent compliance efforts. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR 
(1991), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/selected-publications/factors-decisions-criminal-prosecutions 
[https://perma.cc/22ZF-7KRQ]. 
 179 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has 
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”); Smith v. United 
States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967) (“The discretion of the Attorney General in choosing whether 
to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution already started, is absolute.”). 
 180 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“We will not 
interfere with the Attorney General’s prosecutorial discretion unless it is abused to such an extent as to 
be arbitrary and capricious and violative of due process.”); see also Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra 
note 32, at 683–84 (describing how courts “have disclaimed virtually any authority to review executive 
charging decisions”). 
 181 For these reasons, an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act protects agency documents, 
the production of which “would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if 
such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) 
(2012); see also Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1192–93 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that the 
exception’s broadness is due to “the importance of deterrence” in ensuring enforcement of the laws). 
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environmental statutes exceed the corresponding civil penalties.182 Under the 
ESA, for instance, criminal penalties are much higher and thus a much 
stronger deterrent.183 A hunter might find that “taking” an endangered grizzly 
bear is worth up to $12,000 if he knows he will not face criminal 
enforcement, including incarceration.184 The same is true of industry actors, 
who may find that the low civil violation costs of “harming” a population of 
endangered Gila trout does not exceed the monetary benefits of constructing 
a business complex. 
Lack of criminal enforcement further diminishes complex statutory 
schemes for crimes that are solely federal. In other areas of the law, federal 
offenses overlap with each other and with state substantive offenses.185 But 
this is rarely true for environmental statutes. The state may lack equivalent 
environmental legislation,186 the federal statute may preempt state law,187 or 
the federal scheme may preempt federal common law.188 Federal 
enforcement is thus pivotal to maintaining the vitality of these provisions, 
especially the criminal provisions, so as not to cripple an entire scheme 
hinging upon enforcement and deterrence. Severely underenforcing those 
provisions saps the schemes of their strength. 
Environmental laws often have this second characteristic—they rely on 
federal enforcement. There are two potential exceptions. First, some statutes 
established cooperative federalism schemes that allow the states to enforce 
certain provisions.189 Not all states have taken advantage of this, however, 
 
 182 See generally Crooks et al., supra note 106 (discussing criminal and civil penalties under 
environmental statutes). 
 183 See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text (discussing penalties under the ESA). 
 184 “Taking” includes killing. See 16 U.S.C.§ 1532(19) (2012). 
 185 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 518–
19 (2001) (discussing, for example, the federal criminal code’s general false statement statute along with 
its “seemingly endless” statutes prohibiting false statements in specific settings). 
 186 For instance, some states have their own versions of the ESA, see, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE 
§§ 2051–2115.5 (West 1984), but even the most robust of these statutes lack the federal ESA’s punch, 
see, e.g., Lynn E. Dwyer & Dennis D. Murphy, Fulfilling the Promise: Reconsidering and Reforming the 
California Endangered Species Act, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 735, 742–44 (1995) (describing how—
despite similar statutory language—California’s ESA is weaker than the federal ESA “in interpretation 
and practice”). 
 187 See, e.g., Rollins Envtl. Servs. (FS), Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that the federal Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA) preempted an ordinance banning 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)). 
 188 See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981) (finding that CWA preempted a federal 
common law nuisance suit). 
 189 See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive 
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens: Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit 
Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 408 (2004); see also John C. Chambers, Jr., & Peter L. Gray, 
EPA and State Roles in RCRA and CERCLA, 4 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 7, 7–8 (1989) (describing 
RCRA’s and CERCLA’s schemes for delegating power to state agencies). 
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and in some cases the federal government retains enforcement authority over 
certain actions.190 Federal enforcement thus retains importance even under 
those schemes. 
The second potential exception is citizen suits, which most 
environmental statutes feature. Citizen-suit provisions allow members of the 
interested public to act as private attorneys general and bring enforcement 
suits.191 This seemingly lessens reliance on federal enforcement, which 
alleviates concerns about federal underenforcement. However, citizen suits 
lack the same reach and effectiveness as federal enforcement in four ways. 
First, citizen suits do not extend to criminal prohibitions. Criminal suits must, 
by their nature, be brought by the government. Thus, the prohibitions with 
the heaviest penalties rely exclusively on government enforcement. 
Second, citizen suits often cannot reach as much activity as government 
enforcement actions can. For example, under RCRA, the citizen-suit 
provision provides for suits against persons “alleged to be in violation,” 
meaning presently in violation of RCRA’s requirements.192 Government 
enforcement actions, on the other hand, encompass both ongoing and past 
violations.193 Under RCRA, the EPA could choose to rarely enforce past 
violations. Citizen suits cannot rectify this. And if that underenforcement 
pattern became apparent, potential violators could time their violations to 
occur for short time periods to escape enforcement—thus lessening the 
statute’s deterrent effect.194 
Third, citizen suits face the hurdle of Article III standing requirements. 
Parties must demonstrate that they have suffered an actual and imminent 
injury in fact that is traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a 
favorable decision.195 Meeting these requirements, especially those of injury 
in fact and redressability, can be especially difficult in environmental suits.196 
Ameliorating this is the fact that states receive “special solicitude” when 
 
 190 See Chambers & Gray, supra note 189, at 7–8. 
 191 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (CWA’s citizen-suit provision). States can also sue under 
citizen-suit provisions. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–21 (2007). 
 192 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 193 Id. § 6973. This is true for other statutes as well. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012) 
(ESA’s citizen-suit provision for present violations); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (CWA’s citizen-suit provision 
for present violations). This was once the case under the Clean Air Act (CAA), see Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1987), but Congress subsequently 
amended the CAA to allow citizen suits to reach past violations, see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2012). 
 194 Cf. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(noting concern that violators could take advantage of a good day to claim they are no longer in violation 
of the statute). 
 195 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 196 See, e.g., id. at 562–64, 568–71 (finding that parties did not meet the injury-in-fact and 
redressability elements). 
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suing under citizen-suit provisions because states may try to fill a federal 
underenforcement gap.197 But still, this doctrine is unclear and depends on 
states wanting to sue, and these requirements still hinder citizen suits.198 
Lastly, citizen suits cannot counteract underenforcement when the 
government does enforce the statute but does so with more difficult-to-meet 
requirements than used in citizen suits. An example of the agency requiring 
a higher standard is the McKittrick Policy, which requires prosecutors to be 
able to demonstrate the standard of specific intent to initiate ESA 
prosecutions.199 Citizen-suit provisions require that notice be tendered to the 
violator and administering agency and that there be a delay between notice 
and bringing suit.200 This is meant to give the agency time to bring an 
enforcement action on its own. If the federal or state government brings an 
enforcement action, a citizen suit is thus precluded.201 So if an agency 
required higher standards than a citizen suit, then the government could bring 
an action under that difficult-to-meet standard and preclude citizen 
enforcement actions. That suit would likely have a higher chance of failure 
due to the higher standards imposed by the government. For these reasons, 
citizen suits cannot completely fill the gaps caused by underenforcement 
when statutes rely on federal enforcement. Severe underenforcement 
therefore can cripple complex statutory schemes with these characteristics. 
2. Constitutional and Balance of Powers Concerns 
Severe underenforcement also presents two broad constitutional 
concerns and other pragmatic balance of powers issues. First, severe 
 
 197 When states sue to protect their “quasi-sovereign interests, [they are] entitled to special solicitude 
in [the] standing analysis.” See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). What that means is still 
not entirely clear, but it seems that states can more easily satisfy Article III standing requirements. See 
Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited 
Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 397–98 (2011). See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption 
State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2017) (exploring when a state has standing to sue the 
government based on Executive Branch underenforcement). 
 198 Indeed, some scholars argue that the tightening of standing requirements has allowed for 
administrative overreach. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 101–
32 (2014). 
 199 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. The McKittrick Policy is not a perfect example 
because it applies in the criminal context and citizen-suit provisions cannot compel criminal enforcement. 
However, a similar policy for civil actions would raise this issue. 
 200 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (2012); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(b) (2012). 
 201 See 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b); Miller, supra note 189, at 409. State suits may 
also be precluded if the federal government sues, and vice versa, due to concerns of overfiling and 
overenforcement. See, e.g., Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
EPA cannot file suit if the state has filed suit under its delegated powers under RCRA). But see, e.g., 
United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that EPA can file suit 
if it gives the state notice). 
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underenforcement potentially violates the constitutional principle underlying 
separation of powers, and specifically the Presentment Clause,202 by 
effectively allowing the President to repeal laws. Second, severe 
underenforcement may also violate the Take Care Clause203 because the 
President either is suspending or dispensing with the laws or is not faithfully 
executing the laws. In addition, the lack of judicial review for severe 
underenforcement presents sub-constitutional balance of powers concerns. 
First, severe underenforcement potentially allows the Executive to 
effectively repeal laws, which is a legislative power.204 The President has one 
chance to veto a statute under the Presentment Clause.205 Severe 
underenforcement after a statute has been passed, however, can achieve 
substantially the same effect: although the statute remains on the books, it is 
rarely enforced.206 Suppose that a President faces difficulty in achieving her 
policy goals, or wants to expeditiously enact policies while she has a 
Congress that will not oppose her, and directs an agency to only bring a few 
enforcement actions per year under a particular statute.207 The abdication 
exception, as it is currently interpreted, likely does not allow review of these 
decisions not to enforce. Unless the agency completely stopped enforcing 
the statute or adopted a general enforcement policy—which is unlikely, 
considering how easy it is to sidestep those prerequisites—these 
nonenforcement decisions would remain unreviewable under the APA. Even 
if congressional members were to sue the President for a constitutional 
violation of the Presentment Clause or other separation of powers principles, 
it is unclear whether they would have standing or whether the suit would be 
 
 202 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 203 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 204 This ultimately may be a temporary repeal because the next administration can just as easily undo 
it. One vivid example is how the Trump Administration rescinded the Obama Administration’s 
memorandum establishing DACA. See Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al., 
Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect 
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children” (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/J9FG-DMKB]. For more on the original 
memoranda establishing DACA, see supra note 14. 
 205 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 206 That implied statutory repeals are disfavored, see Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009), 
makes this especially egregious: The President can accomplish through severe underenforcement what 
otherwise takes concerted legislative effort. 
 207 This is not so farfetched. See Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 32, at 687 (“In an era of 
partisan polarization and legislative gridlock, Presidents often cannot count on Congress to develop 
legislative solutions to perceived problems, or even to negotiate over such solutions in good faith. 
Nevertheless, the public increasingly holds the President accountable for all failures of national policy. 
Reliance on all forms of executive authority, without resort to Congress, thus becomes a nearly irresistible 
temptation for modern Presidents.”). Consider the Obama Administration’s underenforcement of certain 
immigration directives as a potential example. See supra notes 14 & 41. 
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nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.208 Severe 
underenforcement is thus potentially unreviewable under the APA and 
nonjusticiable under the Presentment Clause. 
Second, severe underenforcement may violate the Take Care Clause. 
Under the Take Care Clause, the President “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”209 Once a law is passed, the President is the one tasked 
with ensuring that it is enforced, even if she retains some discretion enforcing 
it.210 The President cannot totally ignore a law or dispense with it as to certain 
 
 208 Congress likely has standing to sue when the President fails to enforce a duly enacted and 
unambiguous statute. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 446 (1939). Yet it is unclear how far that 
extends to severe underenforcement rather than total nonenforcement. See generally Bethany R. Pickett, 
Note, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional Standing in Instances of Presidential 
Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439 (2016) (analyzing Congressional standing and political 
question precedent and arguing that members of Congress should have standing to sue when there is 
executive nonenforcement). 
 Notably, in 2014, the House of Representatives sued various Obama Administration officials based 
on the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), including the Administration’s delay in 
implementing certain provisions. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d. 53, 57 
(D.D.C. 2015) (mem.). The plaintiffs presented two theories for standing, which the district court termed 
the “Non–Appropriation Theory” and the “Employer–Mandate Theory.” See id. at 70. The gist of the 
Non–Appropriation Theory was that the “Executive ha[d] spent billions of dollars without a valid 
appropriation, in direct contravention of [the Appropriations Clause].” Id. at 69. The Employer–Mandate 
Theory alleged that the Secretary of the Treasury “ha[d] not abided by the employer mandate as it was 
enacted in the ACA, thereby ‘nullifying’ the law.” Id. (quoting plaintiff’s complaint). 
 The court first found that the House had standing for its constitutional claims under the Non–
Appropriation Theory, see id. at 74, highlighting that it was a specific constitutional claim that “the 
Executive ha[d] drawn funds from the Treasury without a congressional appropriation” in violation of the 
Constitution. See id. at 70. As for the Employer–Mandate Theory, which contained the claim challenging 
the delayed implementation of the ACA, the House essentially argued “that any member of the Executive 
who exceeds his statutory authority is unconstitutionally legislating.” Id. at 75. That “argument prove[d] 
too much” for the court. Id. Holding otherwise, according to the court, would transform “every instance 
of an extra-statutory action” into “a cognizable constitutional violation, redressable by Congress through 
a lawsuit.” Id. But this “would contradict decades of administrative law and precedent.” Id. (“In sum, 
Article I is not a talisman; citing its most general provisions does not transform a statutory violation into 
a constitutional case or controversy.”). 
 While the court did not address the abdication exception, or the issues implicated by severe 
underenforcement or total nonenforcement, this case suggests that the House (and the Senate) would 
likely not have standing in such situations because they would lack a cognizable injury. And although the 
House might have standing under a Non–Appropriation Theory for specific constitutional violations of 
the Appropriations Clause, delays in implementing laws, instances of severe underenforcement, or total 
nonenforcement are unlikely to present that situation—in fact, fewer resources may be spent. Thus, 
Congress may lack the ability to redress these issues through constitutional claims in the courts. 
 209 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 210 This is arguably despite policy differences with the enacting or current Congress. See Robert J. 
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration 
Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 794 (2013). 
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persons.211 Doing so is an exercise of an unconstitutional suspension or 
dispensing power.212 Severe underenforcement, though, closely resembles an 
exercise of such a power because the law has effectively been suspended or 
dispensed with as to certain situations.213 And even if severe 
underenforcement is not a suspension or dispensing of the laws, it may be an 
unfaithful execution of the laws, which is arguably unconstitutional.214 The 
exact scope of the Take Care Clause, however, is an open question, and it is 
unclear whether a claim under the Take Care Clause is even justiciable.215 
In sum, severe underenforcement is generally unreviewable under the 
APA and Chaney. Claims that severe underenforcement violates the 
Presentment Clause or Take Care Clause are likely nonjusticiable. Outside 
of the courtroom, Congress has little realistic power or incentive to check the 
President’s underenforcement;216 inside it, members may lack standing to 
 
 211 See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (“To contend that 
the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their 
execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”). 
 212 See id.; Blackman, supra note 70, at 219–33; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 210, at 803–08. The 
suspension power is “the power to set aside the operation of a statute for a time.” LOIS G. SCHWOERER, 
THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 59–60 (1981). Similarly, the dispensing power is “the power to 
grant permission to an individual or a corporation to disobey a statute.” Id. at 60. 
 213 For instance, the deferred-action immigration initiatives under the Obama Administration 
allowed certain groups that were statutorily designated as unlawfully present to gain lawful-presence 
status. See supra note 14. That may have constituted an exercise of the dispensing power. 
 214 I use “arguably” because the Court has rarely discussed what constitutes a violation of the Take 
Care Clause. Some scholars, however, have argued that an unfaithful execution of the laws is 
unconstitutional. See Blackman, supra note 70, at 267–80; Randy Barnett, The President’s Duty of Good 
Faith Performance, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/12/the-presidents-duty-of-good-
faith-performance/?utm_term=.470959fffb0f [https://perma.cc/WQJ4-2W2L]. 
 215 The most relevant case on justiciability is Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), 
in which Mississippi sued President Andrew Johnson to enjoin enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts. 
The Court found that the President’s duties in enforcing laws involved discretion, rather than being mere 
ministerial duties, and thus “court[s] ha[d] no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the 
performance of his official duties.” Id. at 501; see also Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 600 (denying “the 
power of the judiciary to interfere in advance, and to instruct the executive . . . how to act”). Justiciability 
was also an issue debated in the briefs of the recent case of Texas v. United States. 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 
2015). In fact, the Supreme Court added the question of whether DAPA violated the Take Care Clause 
when it granted certiorari. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). But because the Court 
affirmed by an equally divided vote, see United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), the question 
remains unresolved. 
 216 Using the power of the purse to reduce spending for underenforced statutes would likely do little; 
moreover, using it to reduce other spending may result in electoral backlash or other negative 
consequences (such as underenforcement of those statutes). There are realistically few effective checks 
on Presidential inaction. See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation 
of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2014). Arguably, one potential check is the electoral process 
and the potential subsequent destruction of the President’s legacy. But it is unclear how much the electoral 
process is a check on a President facing a recalcitrant Congress, a President lacking any compelling 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1206 
sue. The judiciary has thus closed all avenues for review of severe 
underenforcement policies. In doing so, it has inappropriately bowed out of 
its duty to interpret the law.217 
Severe underenforcement also upsets the balance of powers among the 
three branches. For instance, severe underenforcement relieves pressure on 
Congress to consider whether certain statutes are still aligned with current 
preferences.218 This could potentially “reduce incentives for lawmakers to 
undertake the hard bargains and difficult votes that are often necessary to 
enact significant legislation.”219 Consequently, although Congress is the 
branch entrusted with making policy decisions and is most directly 
accountable to the electorate, it might no longer make these pivotal 
decisions. 
Moreover, courts’ failure to review severe underenforcement can add 
to the already high levels of interbranch conflict.220 The lack of judicial 
review and judicial remedy in cases of severe underenforcement removes the 
judiciary from its potential role as arbiter, which can exacerbate interbranch 
tensions.221 For instance, if the President escalates policy-driven 
nonenforcement and underenforcement efforts due to Congressional 
gridlock and the judiciary will not step in, Congress may escalate its 
responses.222 Rather than easing gridlock, this can intensify it.223 
To be sure, there are important concerns about letting courts review 
underenforcement that should not be dismissed. For example, the President 
is in a tough situation when faced with an obstructionist Congress or with a 
pressing issue that requires an immediate response. Some scholars have 
argued that when Congress refuses to enact legislation or policies, it is 
appropriate for the President to respond with nonenforcement and 
underenforcement.224 Moreover, the President may have a prerogative not to 
 
incentive to garner public support (such as a President serving her second term who will personally face 
little electoral backlash), or even simply on a President who cares little about approval ratings. 
 217 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1382–83 (1998) (advocating for the idea 
of the federal judiciary as a separation of powers umpire). 
 218 See Price, Politics, supra note 9, at 1146; Stuntz, supra note 185, at 546–49. 
 219 Price, Politics, supra note 9, at 1147. 
 220 See id. at 1145–46. 
 221 See id. 
 222 Id. at 1146. 
 223 Id. 
 224 See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2014) 
(arguing that nonenforcement tactics are a proportional and appropriate response to violations of 
legislative norms such as obstructive filibustering). 
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enforce laws in certain situations, such as when there is a compelling public 
necessity225 or when the President believes a law to be unconstitutional.226 
Courts reviewing severe underenforcement may also upset the 
separation of powers and interbranch balance in three ways. First, the 
Executive must have some discretion in allocating scarce enforcement 
resources,227 especially when enforcing criminal statutes.228 Permitting courts 
to review nonenforcement decisions may endanger that discretion. Second, 
allowing courts to review, and perhaps mandate, enforcement potentially 
collapses the boundaries between the Judicial and Executive Branches by 
effectively allowing the judiciary to enforce the laws.229 Lastly, there may be 
a diminishment of judicial authority if the Executive refuses to comply with 
a court’s order.230 
These are legitimate concerns, but allowing judicial review of severe 
underenforcement under the APA does not necessarily implicate them. 
Severe underenforcement exceeds the individual discretion contemplated by 
prosecutorial discretion.231 The Court recognized this in establishing the 
abdication exception in the first place.232 In addition, a court need not 
mandate enforcement. If the court reviews a general policy amounting to 
abdication, then it can find that policy arbitrary and capricious under the 
APA,233 which alleviates the above concerns.234 
 
 225 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 210, at 808–35. Professors Delahunty and Yoo do generally 
limit this executive prerogative power to the national security and foreign affairs contexts. See id. at 823–
28 (discussing how “American constitutional practice shows that [the prerogative power] has been 
reserved to national security and foreign affairs”). 
 226 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1616–17 (2008); Stepanicich, supra note 73, 1536–38. 
 227 See Stepanicich, supra note 73, at 1538–39. 
 228 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005) (discussing “[t]he deep-
rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion, even in the presence of seemingly mandatory legislative 
commands”). 
 229 See Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 75, at 1573. But see Sunstein, supra note 25, 669–71 
(arguing that this “promotes rather than undermines” separation of powers in cases of statutory violations 
by the Executive). 
 230 But see Sunstein, supra note 25, at 670–71 (rejecting this argument). 
 231 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 232 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985). 
 233 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 234 A finding that the policy was arbitrary and capricious would send the policy back to the agency 
rather than require immediate enforcement. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (remanding to the Court of Appeals with instructions to 
remand to the agency for further consideration after finding that the policy in question was arbitrary and 
capricious). Any new policy the agency devised would have to not constitute severe underenforcement 
to escape another finding of arbitrary and capricious in a later suit. 
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C. Underenforcement as Abdication 
Most courts and scholars have interpreted Chaney’s abdication 
exception as including total nonenforcement but not severe 
underenforcement. As previously discussed, they have misread Chaney to 
preclude review of anything except total nonenforcement.235 Moreover, this 
interpretation overlooks the serious concerns that severe underenforcement 
poses—many of which align with those that total enforcement also presents. 
To alleviate these concerns, courts should interpret severe underenforcement 
as amounting to abdication sufficient to rebut Chaney’s presumption of 
unreviewability.236 
The main obstacle to adopting a severe underenforcement approach is 
that courts are unwilling to infer a general policy from repeated 
nonenforcement and unofficial agency representations. Admittedly, it is 
easier in some cases to infer that there is a policy than in others. Recall the 
McKittrick Policy, in which the DOJ required prosecutors to request specific 
jury instructions in prosecutions under the ESA. There, the DOJ had 
internally disseminated the policy through a memorandum, which likely 
made it easier for the court to infer a general policy from the pattern of 
underenforcement.237 
Rather than refuse to evaluate whether severe underenforcement is 
occurring, courts should look beyond the fact that agencies are still partially 
enforcing statutes or have not adopted a general enforcement policy. Instead, 
courts must be more willing to infer a general policy amounting to abdication 
from a pattern of severe underenforcement consisting of, for example, 
 
 235 See supra Section II.C. 
 236 This is superior to a solution that involves Congressional action. True, there are actions that 
Congress could take, such as requiring agencies to publish when they adopt policies that amount to severe 
underenforcement so that those policies could be reviewed. But this is an inferior option for three reasons. 
First, it may violate the Constitution. If the statute curtailed Presidential oversight of how the laws are 
executed, it could be infringing upon the President’s powers under the Take Care Clause. See generally 
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 
541 (1994) (arguing that the text of the Constitution supports a unitary Executive and that the President 
must have stricter control over the Executive Branch). Second, it is pragmatically unlikely. It is hard to 
imagine that Congress can overcome the inertia required to pass a statute that requires this of agencies, 
especially when Congress may have little incentive to do so. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, 
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 
592–94 (explaining Congressional inertia in passing statutes). Something that may hinder a President 
whose party has a majority in Congress would likely not garner enough Congressional support. See Josh 
Blackman, Gridlock, 130 HARV. L. REV. 241, 242–43 (2016). Third, publicizing enforcement policies 
curtails enforcement’s deterrent strength. See Price, Politics, supra note 9, at 1138 (“[E]nforcement 
transparency will often be counterproductive: the more public the nonenforcement policy, the stronger 
the signal to regulated parties that they may organize their behavior around the enforcement policy rather 
than the statute or regulation.”); see also supra note 176–84 and accompanying text. 
237 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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multiple or systematic agency refusals to enforce a provision or statute. This 
ensures that agencies cannot severely underenforce a statute while escaping 
judicial review under the APA. Because a policy that severely underenforces 
a statute and qualifies for the abdication exception is likely to be arbitrary 
and capricious,238 broadening the interpretation will result in review that acts 
as a meaningful check. 
Under this approach, the result in PETA239 may have differed. In that 
case, the D.C. Circuit refused to find a general policy of nonenforcement 
even though the agency itself had essentially admitted in multiple individual 
responses that it refused to enforce the statute because it believed that the 
agency had no jurisdiction.240 If the court had been willing to look more 
closely at those representations and how the agency was enforcing the statute 
overall, it may have found that the agency was consciously and expressly 
underenforcing the statute to such a degree as to implicate the concerns 
involved in severe underenforcement. In such a case, a court should find that 
the claim qualifies for the abdication exception and is thus reviewable. 
Adopting a severe underenforcement approach will not only alleviate 
the pressing concerns previously outlined but will also provide incentives for 
agencies to be more thoughtful in their enforcement. The availability of 
judicial review (or lack thereof) impacts agency decisions.241 Knowing that 
meaningful judicial review under the APA lurks around the corner might 
increase the likelihood that decision-makers will adhere more closely to 
legislative intent in enforcing statutes, whereas knowing that courts use the 
total nonenforcement approach could have the opposite impact.242 
To be sure, the severe underenforcement approach leads to more 
potential review of agency action, and in general, courts would prefer to 
defer to agencies. But this potential increase in opportunities for judicial 
review should not be a huge concern. First, very few cases would even 
qualify for the abdication exception, as evidenced by the low number of 
cases that have arisen since Chaney that have even referenced the exception. 
Those cases, however, present the dire concerns explored above, and thus 
the need for potential review in those few cases would outweigh concerns 
about allowing more review of agency action. And second, this approach 
aligns with the APA because the discretion involved in severe 
underenforcement exceeds the discretion contemplated by the APA’s 
 
 238 See supra notes 119 & 129. 
 239 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S Dep’t of Agric., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 
2013). 
 240 Id. at 12. 
 241 See Sunstein, supra note 25, at 656. 
 242 See id. at 656–57. 
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exception from judicial review for agency action “committed to agency 
discretion by law.”243 This therefore would not constitute an unmandated 
extension of judicial review but one that fits within the structure of the APA, 
as recognized by the Court in Chaney.244 
A more pragmatic issue this approach may pose is manageability 
concerns for courts. As previously noted, this Note defines severe 
underenforcement as underenforcement so severe that it reaches the same 
pragmatic result as total nonenforcement. Finding the line between 
individual discretion and severe underenforcement can admittedly be 
difficult. For instance, myriad reasons could potentially explain why the DOJ 
failed to enforce the relevant provision of the ESA despite the high number 
of Mexican wolf killings, such as a lack of resources or evidence. In those 
cases, a kind of burden-shifting scheme might emerge: once the challenger 
has shown that there has been severe underenforcement, like with the ESA’s 
taking prohibition, the burden might shift to the defending agency to 
demonstrate that it is applying discretion on a case-by-case basis rather than 
consciously, expressly, and severely underenforcing the statute. In doing so, 
courts may look at ongoing attempts at enforcement, such as whether the 
incident was investigated, or require explanations from the defending 
agencies. It is possible that a court may struggle with parsing through 
complicated explanations. But this analysis is not too much to ask of courts 
because this is the type of analysis that courts do daily, especially in the 
administrative law context. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Chaney to render agency nonenforcement 
presumptively unreviewable under the APA necessarily recognized the 
importance of executive discretion in enforcing the laws. In doing so, it also 
left the door open for agencies to categorically not enforce or severely 
underenforce statutes and escape judicial review. But the Chaney Court also 
established the abdication exception to prevent agencies from escaping 
review under the APA. Courts and scholars, however, have consistently 
interpreted the abdication exception as only encompassing total 
nonenforcement or as requiring a general enforcement policy. Courts have 
thus let potential agency abdication, in the form of severe underenforcement, 
continue unchecked. 
This poses two sets of serious concerns. The first involves how severe 
underenforcement harms complex statutory schemes that have overlapping 
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civil and criminal penalties and that heavily rely on federal enforcement. The 
second involves how severe underenforcement potentially violates the 
Constitution’s Presentment and Take Care Clauses and creates balance of 
powers concerns. To alleviate these concerns, courts should interpret 
Chaney’s abdication exception to encompass severe agency 
underenforcement as well as total nonenforcement. Otherwise, there is no 
effective way to review severe underenforcement under the APA to 
determine whether it is arbitrary and capricious. Allowing review in these 
situations would alleviate the pressing concerns that severe 
underenforcement poses and would fully vindicate the judicial branch’s role, 
as recognized in Chaney, of checking agency abdication. 
 
  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1212 
 
